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Abstract
This paper models the gold standard as a state contingent commitment technol-
ogy that is only feasible during peace. Monetary policy during war, when the gold
convertibility rule is suspended, can still be credible, if the policy makers plan is to
resume the gold standard in the future. The DGE model developed in this paper
suggests that the resumption of the gold standard was a sustainable plan, which
replaced the gold standard as a commitment technology and made monetary policy
time consistent. Trigger strategies support the equilibrium: private agents retaliate
if a policy maker defaults its plan to resume the gold standard.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally the gold standard has been modelled as an automatic and impersonal mon-
etary system, golden fetters, which restricted sovereignspower over economic policy.
The gold standard rule obligated each central bank to maintain the value of the national
paper currency in terms of a xed weight of gold by buying and selling gold at a xed
price on demand. The convertibility rule and reserves set a limit to the money supply
and guaranteed almost zero ination.1 Yet, if we expand our focus from the relatively
short-lived International Classical Gold Standard of 1880-1914 to a wider time horizon,
the gold standard and other commodity standards do not emerge as such disciplinarian
rules. According to the surveys by Bordo and Kydland (1995, 1996) and Bordo and
Schwartz (1997) 21 countries defaulted on the convertibility rule on 38 occasions before
World War II. For example, the commodity standard was suspended in France during the
French Revolution, in England from 1797-1821 during the French Wars, in the US from
1862-1878 during the Civil War and in several countries during the First World War.
Instead of a monotonic policy rule, this paper considers the gold standard as a commit-
ment mechanism that restricted monetary policy during normal times, but which became
unfeasible during major wars and crises. Because monetary authorities were able to de-
cide how much inconvertible duciary money to issue during the suspension periods, they
were predecessors of the modern at money system. But compared with the hyperina-
tionary paper money experiments of the twentieth century, suspensions were relatively
successful: in 24 out of 38 cases the gold standard was resumed without devaluations and
the inconvertible paper money remained in circulation during the suspension.
According to Bordo et al monetary policy under the suspensions was credible, because
the gold standard was a contingent rule: during a wartime emergency, when the govern-
1See calculations by Santoni (1984).
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ment needed to collect seigniorage revenue, the gold standard rule could be abandoned
temporarily on the understanding that after the emergency had passed safely convertibility
would be restored at original parity. Along the lines of this theory, agents considered the
gold standard and the suspension to be essentially the same monetary system and could
not think of any feasible alternatives to gold: Thus, when an emergency occurred, the
abandonment of the standard would be viewed by all to be a temporary event since, from
their [the publics] experience, only gold or gold-backed claims truly served as money.2
My interpretation of contingency di¤ers from that of Bordo et al in that I assume the
resumption of the gold standard to be endogenous, not exogenous. I chose this alternative
approach because it is supported by historical evidence: rstly, the resumption date was
unknown during the suspensions or policy makers moved previously agreed resumption
date forward; and secondly, on several occasions the return to the gold standard created
strong political opposition. In this paper the bad state, war, is unexpected, and can
lead to two potential defaults. The rst default is what Grossman and Van Huyck (1988)
call excusable and it occurs when the authority is forced to abandon the commitment
technology, the gold standard, upon arrival of the bad state. The second potential default
follows the monetary authoritys decision not to resume the original gold convertibility
rule even though the state of the world has switched back to the good state. This default
is total and unjustied, and leads to the loss of the monetary authoritys reputation. But
if the resumption of the commitment rule involves incurring a cost, as in this model, the
authority might not have an incentive to resume the rule. A key objective of the model
is to dene conditions which ensure that the second default does not occur and the gold
convertibility rule is resumed.
In this paper I evaluate the question of what makes monetary policy credible and time
2Bordo and Kydland (1995).
3
consistent in the absence of the commitment mechanism the gold standard. To avoid
getting entangled with the historical details of various suspension periods, I develop a
dynamic general equilibrium model of the gold standard and the suspension, and use it to
analyze the extent by which the gold standard functions as a contingent rule. The model
demonstrates that the gold standard with a xed gold reserve ratio is a commitment tech-
nology that solves the economys time inconsistency problem in the conduct of monetary
policy if the economy has nominal rigidities, but the suspension of the gold standard
subsequently reveals the problem. Because the money base under the suspension is not
xed to the existing gold reserve, the central bank, in the presence of sticky wages, has an
opportunity to expand output and yield seigniorage to the government by issuing incon-
vertible paper money. I conduct the analysis within the cash-in-advance model, which,
by emphasizing the paper money as a medium of exchange, describes the role of paper
money in those relatively developed economies that suspended the convertibility rule.
As suspension periods often lasted several years, even decades, the policy maker and
the public had time to interact, and, therefore, my model emphasizes the paramount role
of the publics expectations and policy makers reputation in making the suspension a
credible regime. Following Chari and Kehoe (1990), the model adapts Abreaus (1988)
optimal penal codes under discounting to policy games played between a benevolent gov-
ernment and private sector. The sustainable policy plan during the suspension to resume
the gold standard at the old par value in the future is supported by a reputational equi-
librium in which private expectations display an extreme form of trigger-like behavior: a
single deviation by the central bank from its announced plan to resume the gold stan-
dard causes the economy to revert permanently to its worst possible outcome, which, in
this commodity standard setup, I call a commodity money. If compared with the gold
standard, the commodity money regime, where only gold coins circulate as a medium of
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exchange, is ine¢ cient and reduces welfare. The gold standard is resumed if the incentive
compatibility constraint is satised: the discounted net utility of the adjustment and the
gold standard has to be larger or equal to the discounted net utility of default and the
commodity money thereafter.
My theoretical analysis produces three main results. Firstly, the suspension is a cred-
ible regime, because the resumption of the gold standard at the original par value is
a sustainable plan. The central banks plan to resume the gold standard at some fu-
ture point replaces the gold standard as a reputational device, which limits discretionary
money creation and solves the time inconsistency problem. Secondly, the model explains
why the central bank resumes the gold standard although the suspension, by increasing
a degree of exibility in the economy, proves to be a relatively successful regime. The
gold standard is resumed, because it maximizes social welfare in the long-run as during
normal times the central bank cannot conduct time consistent monetary policy without
commitment technology. Finally, sustainability of the resumption plan is of vital impor-
tance to the economy during war. Private agents accept paper money as a medium of
exchange because they believe that in the future paper money would again be convert-
ible. Sustainability of wartime monetary policy enables the central bank to (i) stabilize
output and consumption through private discount policy; (ii) derive seigniorage revenue
to the government through public discount policy and (iii) postpone the welfare reducing
adjustment to peacetime.
Despite the long-standing interest of economists in the suspensions, only a handful
of open market models exist, and the suspension has not been modelled in the general
equilibrium, or a credibility and time inconsistency framework. Although many aspects
of my model are in the tradition of the relatively recently published classical models on
a commodity money standard proposed by Barro (1979), Sargent and Wallace (1983),
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Goodfriend (1988), Velde and Weber (2000) and Bordo et al. (2003), the fundamental
di¤erence is that I model the gold standard as an endogenous domestic monetary policy
rule, not as a exogenous xed monetary constitution or as a xed exchange rate system.
The model is not a complete presentation of the economic policy under the suspension,
and I focus on monetary policy and theory. Neither do I model some specic historical
period but describe a new framework which includes key elements of the suspension.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I present the baseline model, which,
by changing the values of key parameters, I use to analyze monetary policy under the
gold standard and the suspension. In Section III, I characterize the sustainability of
the resumption plan and develop some numerical examples. The nal section acts as a
conclusion to the foregoing.
2 ADynamic General EquilibriumModel of the Gold
Standard and the Suspension
The analysis requires the development of a new theoretical model in which the gold
standard rule can be suspended and in which the gold standard operates as a domestic
rather than an international monetary policy rule. The gold standard is a commitment
technology, which, as in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Ireland (1997), is sustainable by
denition and solves the economys time inconsistency problem. Four key elements of the
model are (i) nominal wages are sticky; (ii) the paper money has value only if private
agents are able to convert it to gold instantly or at some future point; (iii) the central
bank functions also as a nancial intermediate and issues unbacked paper money through
discounting; and, (iv) the suspension of the gold standard is exogenous in the bad state of
the world, but the resumption of the gold standard is not exogenous when the economy is
6
again in the good state of the world. In particular, (i) and (iii) are supported by historical
evidence.3
2.1 A Cash-in-Advance Economy
Consider an economy in which the private sector consists of a large number of identical
households and rms, and the public sector of a central bank and a government. Since
households and rms behave as atomistic competitors, the discussion is restricted to a
representative agent of each type. To start with, let us assume that the central bank
follows the gold standard rule by being prepared to buy or sell gold in exchange for paper
currency with the xed conversion rate Q, but without committing to keep the ratio
between its gold reserve and money supply constant. Following Ricardo (1821), money
supply M st is backed by the monetary gold A
g
t
M st =
QAgt
t
: (1)
The gold reserve ratio, which denes the proportion of the circulating paper money stock
that is backed by monetary gold, is denoted by t 2 (0; 1].
The representative household consumes two goods: perishable consumption good Ct
and gold At+1 which depreciates at constant rate of (1  ). The household enters period
t with depreciated gold At which is measured in ounces. The household is then endowed
with xed amount As of new gold, and next, it chooses what proportion of its gold holdings
At+A
s is minted to specie, deposited at the central bank in exchange for paper currency
3Lindert and Williamson (1984) and Hanes (1993) suggest that nominal wages were sticky in England
and the US in the 18th and 19th centuries. Du¤y (1982) shows that the Bank of England was an active
nancial intermediary from 1797-1821. Alternatively, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), private banks
could act as an intermediary, to whom the central bank forwards monetary transfers, but the former
approach was chosen for simplicity.
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and transferred to the next period:
At + A
s    Sst+1   Sst    Agt+1   Agt  = At+1: (2)
In (2)
 
Sst+1   Sst

is the change in period t specie stock, and
 
Agt+1   Agt

the change in
the central banks gold reserve. The equation (2) can be expressed in terms of growth
rates and gold backing by dening the growth rate of specie supply as zt = Sst+1=S
s
t and
the rate of monetary expansion proportional to monetary gold as xt = A
g
t+1=A
g
t ; writing
(1) in terms of Agt and substituting these into (2):
QAt +QA
s  Q (zt   1)Sst   (xt   1) tM st = QAt+1: (3)
I assume that xt 2 (0; x) and zt 2 [1; z), where the upper bound of both zt and xt implies
that At+1 approaches zero and the household converts its whole period t gold holdings
to paper currency or specie. A law restricts smelting of coins back to consumable form,
and therefore the lowest bound of the specie growth rate equals one. As a result of the
households choices, the laws of motion become
Mt+1 =Mt +
(xt   1)
Q
tM
s
t (4)
and
St+1 = St + (1  ) (zt   1)Sst ; (5)
where  2 (0; 1) is the xed depreciation rate of specie between period t and t+ 1 and 
is brassage, the exogenous percentage cost of minting.
In this model, as in many countries during the historical gold standard period, the
central bank functions as a nancial intermediary by discounting bonds issued by the
government and private bills issued by the rm. The central bank, after having accepted
period t gold deposit
 
Agt+1   Agt

from the household, loans out cash to the government
and the rm at the xed rate R  1. As a result (1  t) is the ratio of the total nominal
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loan Bt to the stock of central bank paper money.
M st =
Bt
1  t
: (6)
As neither the government nor the rm have access to the gold endowment, they
face a cash constraint in that they have to take a one period loan, or discountBt+1;
from the central bank in order to be able to buy a public good, or respectively, pay for
workers. The government starts the period t by paying the principal and interest of its
previous periods loan (1  t)RBt to the central bank. The public sectors share of the
total discount Bt is denoted by (1  t). After the household has traded gold with the
central bank, the government takes a new loan (1  t+1)Bt+1 to pay its current period
t expenditure, and at the end of the period t the government imposes a tax T^t to the
household. The governments period-by-period budget constraint is
PtGt  (1  t+1)Bt+1  R (1  t)Bt + T^t: (7)
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000), the government is subject to a cash-in-advance
constraint on its purchases of real goods Gt;
PtGt  (1  t+1)Bt+1: (8)
The representative rm uses labor Lt it hires from the household to produce current
output via its production technology f (K;Lt). The rm produces, pays for its workers,
sells the output to the household on demand for consumption on a cash basis, and after
having received its revenue, the rm pays prots to the household and saves the principal
and the interest of its current period discount that are paid to the central bank at the
beginning of the following period. The cash-in-advance constraint for the rms wage bill
becomes
WtLt  t+1Bt+1; (9)
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where t+1 is the rms sector share of the total discount. The rm hires labor supplied
by the household and the production takes place during the goods exchange. The rm
takes its price Pt from the market, wage from the contract and chooses Bt+1 and Lt to
maximize its prots. The household supplies whatever labor the rm demands. Given
these specications the rms prot maximization problem becomes: maximize
1X
t=0
tft = 
t (PtYt  RtBt) (10)
subject to (9). The rms production function is of form
Yt = f (K;Lt) = K
1 Lt ; (11)
where K is the xed stock of capital, Lt is labor demand in period t, 0 <  < 1; and
f (K;Lt) is a strictly concave function. In equilibrium the real wage bill of the rm must
be equal to the marginal product of labor
RWt
Pt
= f 0 (Lt) : (12)
I assume that the rm and the household agree on wages, which are set in advance for
a period, before the periods gold endowment is realized, and before the central bank has
made its decision over the periods discount. Although the nominal wage, as in Canzoneri
and Dellas (1998), is chosen before the periods output or sales are known, it is set at
a level that is expected to produce the real wage which equates labor supply and labor
demand, and clears the goods market. To dene the wage, the notional labor supply is set
at one, although the actual labor supply and demand may di¤er from this. The contract
wage for period t is Wt =

tf 0(1)
R
= 
K
1 
R
; where 
t is the expected value of Pt before
the state of the world is known or the production started. If (11) and the contract wage
is substituted back into (12) the labor demand of the representative rm can be written
as Lt = (Pt=
t)
1
1  : If K is normalized to 1 and the labor demand is substituted to (11),
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one obtains
Yt = L

t =

Pt

t
 
1 
: (13)
Respectively, the real wage bill of the rm becomes Wt
Pt
Lt =

R

Pt

t
 
1 
and the prots
ft = (1  ) 


 1
t P
1
1 
t : Any unanticipated changes in the price level will cause a di¤er-
ence between the expected and actual price level. If the price level increases unexpectedly,
the real wage bill of the rm decreases and the employment increases to clear the labor
market.
The central bank can either increase or decrease the economys paper money supply
through its discount policy. The rate of discretionary monetary expansion is denoted by
dt and it is an inverse of the growth rate of the gold reserve ratio
dt =
t
t+1
: (14)
The higher dt; the lower the proportion of the circulating paper money stock that is backed
by monetary gold. I assume dt to be bounded above by printing and storage constraint d,
which is assumed to be higher than x or z. As stressed by Barro (1979), the real economy
restricts gold supply, and therefore, x and z; but the upper bound of discretionary paper
money growth rate d can be taken to be arbitrarily large, i.e. dt 2
 
0; d

for all t = 0; 1; :::;
and x; z < d < 1: The net growth rate of the economys paper money supply M st+1 on
period t+ 1 can be dened as
M st+1 = dtxtM
s
t : (15)
This is just an alternative way to dene (1): by substituting dt = t=t+1 and xt =
Agt+1=A
g
t , (15) becomes (1).
Before solving for the household problem, let us scale the nominal variables in gold
endowment constraint (3), the government and rm cash-in-advance constraints (8) and
(9) and in the rms problem with the economys total paper money supply (15) so that
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mt =Mt=M
s
t ; m
s
t =M
s
t =M
s
t = 1; wt = Wt=M
s
t ; q = Q=M
s
t ; pt = Pt=M
s
t and bt = Bt=M
s
t .
In the rms problem the scaled expected price level 
t is denoted by !t:
The households preferences are given by the value of discounted utility per period,
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; At+1) =
1X
t=0
t [u (Ct) + v (At+1)] , (16)
where 0 <  < 1; and functions u and v are concave and twice di¤erentiable. In (16) Ct
denotes the consumption of a perishable good and At+1 the consumption of gold.
The household enters period t with predetermined nominal money mt and depreciated
specie worth qSt. The household then agrees on the nominal wage with the rm after
which the household receives its gold endowment worth qAs. Now the household is in
the position to do its gold trade and minting: it chooses how much gold to consume,
how much to mint and how much to convert to paper money. After these decisions
the households currency holdings are mt + qSt + q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tmst .
Finally, the household receives its labor income wtLt. The rest of the currency holdings are
transferred to the goods market. The cash-in-advance constraint that restricts households
consumption purchases becomes
ptCt  mt + qSt + q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst + (xt   1) tms + wtLt: (17)
Since the central bank functions as a nancial intermediary, labor income is available for
consumption during the same period and enters into the cash-in-advance constraint. At
the end of period t the household receives the cash dividend payment ft from the rm,
the interest yield ct from the central bank and carries the rest of the unspent currency,
specie and gold into period t+ 1. Hence the households budget constraint states
dtxtmt+1+qAt+1+qSt+1  mt+qAt+qSt+qAs+wtLt+ft+ct ptCt qAt q (zt   1)Sst t^t:
(18)
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As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) there are four markets present in this economy: the
goods market, labor market, credit market and money market which in the gold standard
setup is synonymous with the gold market. The private agentsproblem must satisfy the
resource constraint and market clearing conditions
Ct +Gt = Yt (19)
ptGt = (1  t+1) bt+1 (20)
wtLt = t+1bt+1 (21)
Sst = St (22)
mst = mt (23)
bt+1 =
 
1  t+1

mst+1 (24)
for all t = 0; 1; 2:::. By writing (14) for t+1, and substituting it and (15) to (24) gives
bt+1 = (1  t=dt)xtdtmst . If this is substituted into (20) and (21) we get:
ptGt = (1  t+1) (dt   t)xtmst (25)
wtLt = t+1 (dt   t)xtmst . (26)
Like in Chari and Kehoe (1990), the private agentsbehavior can be summarized by
allocations (;  ) and allocation rules (;	). For each period t let  t =
 
 1;t;  2;t

be the
households allocations for the rst and second stages of period t; where  1;t = (At+1; S
s
t )
and  2;t = (Ct; St+1;m
s
t ;mt+1) : Let  = ( 0;  1; :::) denote an innite sequence of such
allocations. The rms allocation for period t is t = (Lt; bt+1) and  = (0; 1; :::) denotes
the innite sequence of the rms allocations. Formally a policy of the central bank is a
sequence d = fd0; d1; :::g of the discretionary money growth rates where dt 2
 
0; d

. Allo-
cation rules are the sequences of functions 	 = (	0;	1; :::) and  = (0;1; :::) that map
policies into sequences of allocations: the households allocation rule 	(d) species the
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setting of  t = (At+1; S
s
t ; St+1; Ct;m
s
t ;mt+1) ; and the rms allocation rule (d) species
the setting of t = (Lt; bt+1) ; for each possible d0; d1; :::.
The households problem is to choose At+1; St+1; Sst ; Ct; mt+1 and m
s
t to maximize
(16) subject to (17), (18) and normalized (3), which becomes
qAt + qA
s   q (zt   1)Sst   (xt   1) t = qAt+1: (27)
The rst order conditions for intemporal consumption and gold consumption must satisfy
q
pt
UC (t) = UA (t+ 1) + 
q
pt+1
UC (t+ 1) : (28)
Appendix A establishes that the cash-in-advance constraint (17) can be expressed as
ptCt = 1 + q + q (1  ) (zt   1) + (xt   1) t + t+1 (dt   t)xt; (29)
the condition for the price level becomes
pt = !

t f1 + q + q (1  ) (zt   1)  t + dtxtg1  ; (30)
and consumption can be written as
Ct = !
 
t f1 + q + q (1  ) (zt   1)  t + dtxtg  Gt: (31)
From these initial solutions, especially from equations (13), (30), and (31), it can be
seen that if the central banks object is to maximize the households utility, it is able to
stimulate economic activity by creating surprise ination in spite of the gold convertibility
rule. If the central bank increases the discretionary money growth rate dt unexpectedly,
the actual price level pt will be above the expected price level !t, which will increase
output, employment and consumption.
Within the above denitions and initial solutions of the government, rm and house-
holds problems in hand, I turn to consider the equilibrium of the economy under the
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gold standard rule with the constant gold reserve ratio ; and then unanticipated devi-
ation from this rule. The gold convertibility rule together with the constant  has been
analyzed by Barro (1979) and Goodfriend (1988), and also this paper considers it as an
exogenous monetary policy rule that is not an outcome of an optimization problem. Pol-
icy under the gold standard, therefore, does not directly compare with an optimal policy
under commitment, called the Ramsey policy, in Stokey (1989), Chari and Kehoe (1990),
Ireland (1997) and Chang (1998).
2.2 The Gold Standard with the Constant Reserve Ratio: Com-
mitment Technology
Consider the economy when at the beginning of time the central bank commits to the
gold convertibility rule whilst keeping the gold reserve ratio constant at t =  for all
t = 0; 1; 2; :::. This section shows that the gold standard with the constant reserve ratio
is a commitment technology that solves the economys time inconsistency problem that
is created by the nominal wage stickiness.
Denition 1. The gold standard equilibrium with the constant reserve ratio  is a
policy d = fdt = 1 j t = 0; 1; 2; :::g and the agents allocation rules (;	) that satisfy
the rms problem to choose Lt and bt+1 to maximize prots (10), and the households
problem to choose At+1; Ct; mst ; St; S
s
t and mt+1 to maximize its utility (16) subject to
constraints (17), (18) and (27) for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::, taking As; pt; R; 
f
t ; 
c
t and wt given
for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
If t =  for all t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (14) indicates that dt = 1. The gold standard equilibrium
is derived in Appendix A, which also establishes
Proposition 1. Under the gold standard rule with constant ; zt = 1; and in equi-
librium Sst = 0 for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::, and St ! 0 when t!1.
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Under the constant  rule in equilibrium the utility maximizing household does not
mint any new specie and only the gradually depreciating initial stock of specie remains in
circulation. What is the intuition for this result? The cash-in-advance constraint imposes
a cost on the economy in that some gold must be used for transaction purposes, either
by converting it to paper money or minting it to coins. The household is better o¤ in
terms of welfare by using only paper currency as a medium of exchange, because specie
depreciates and is involved with a minting cost that reduce the amount of gold in utility
yielding form. In the real world there are physical restrictions on how small coins can be
minted and used, but similar restrictions do not apply to paper currency, which can be
printed in any denominations. The paper currency has two benets over specie: rstly,
through the governments expenditure constraint (8) and the rms wage constraint (9) it
facilitates nancial intermediation; and secondly, by reducing the cost of acquiring money,
it increases the households welfare. Therefore, the model assumes that the specie stock
gets arbitrarily small and insignicant in economic sense when time goes by, and the
analysis is carried out under the assumption that St = Sst = 0:
Proposition 1 together with the gold standard rule with constant  implies that the
total paper money supply (15) becomes M st+1 = xtM
s
t : The gold endowment constraint
(27) reduces into
qAt + qA
s   (xt   1) t = qAt+1 (32)
Period t price level and consumption become
pt = !

t f1   + xtg1  (33)
and
Ct = !
 
t f1   + xtg  Gt. (34)
Proposition 2. The perfect gold standard rule solves the economys time inconsis-
tency problem, and eliminates any uncertainty about the money growth rate.
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Proof: Under the gold standard rule with constant  the central bank cannot stimulate
the economy by monetary transfers as dt = 1; neither there is uncertainty about the future
money growth rate xt; because As is xed and the household chooses xt so that !t = pt for
all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. To demonstrate why the household does not have an incentive to choose
xt which would yield the actual money growth rate to be above the expected money growth
rate, consider the following: assume that the household takes more gold to the central
bank to be converted to notes than was expected during the wage bargain. Equations (33)
and (34) imply that both the price level and consumption increase if the rate of monetary
expansion proportionate to monetary gold, xt; increases above the rate used in contract
wage setting at the previous period. However, this does not hold in equilibrium. Using
the language of Ireland (1997), if at period t  1 wage settersexpectation on the money
growth rate at next period is xe; but the actual money growth rate is xt = xe+t; where
t 2 (0;1) ; from (33) the price level increases, which decreases real wages, through
(13) increases labor demand and through (34) increases consumption. Now the wage
setters would respond by adjusting their wage expectations to xe+t, then the household
would have an incentive to set xt+1 to xt+1 = xe + t+1 where t < t+1 < 1: The
process would continue until xt would approach its upper bound x =

A+A

s
+ 1


all gold holdings converted to paper currency  and the price expectations !t would
approach the upper bound of the price level p = ! =

A+A

s   

. As in Barro and
Gordon (1983a) any systematic benets of ination disappear in equilibrium. However,
in this commodity standard set-up there is an additional constraint (32) which limits
the households willingness to convert gold to paper money. If the money growth rate
approaches its upper bound, the household converts its whole gold endowment to paper
currency. Simultaneously, At+1 gold in utility yielding form approaches zero, which
reduces current period utility, while impact of gold conversion on Ct disappears since
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expectations have been adjusted. 
The policy d = 1 under the gold standard together with particular allocation  t =
	(1) and t = (1) is called the gold standard outcome and is denoted by (1; g;  
g).
It describes the sequences of equilibrium prices and quantities that are obtained when
the central bank manages gold reserves and converts gold to paper currency on demand
according to the exogenous gold standard rule, and the private agents respond to the
exogenous ow of gold by maximizing utility and prots. The gold standard outcome can
be described by the following two proposition:
Proposition 3. The gold standard outcome implies that in equilibrium dt+i =
1; !t+i = pt+i; Lt+i = 1; Ct+i = Yt+i   Gt+i = 1   Gt+i and At+i+1 = iA0 +Pi
t 
i 1 As   q 1  xgt+i   1  for all i = 0; 1; 2; :::.
Proof: In equilibrium !t+i = pt+i and by substituting it and (19) into (13) we get that
Ct+i = 1   Gt+i for all i = 0; 1; 2; :::. By setting mst+i = 1 in (32) and generalizing (32)
gives At+i+1 = 
iA0 +
P
i=0 
i 1 As   q 1  xgt+i   1 . 
Under the gold standard with constant  the rst-order-condition formt+i+1 is xt+it+i =

 
t+i+1 + t+i+1

; where  and  are the Lagrangian multipliers of the households bud-
get and cash-in-advance constraints (see Appendix A). Let us now assume that xt+i is
bound below by  for all i = 0; 1; 2; ::: so that in the steady state , the shadow value of
money, is non-negative and the gold standard equilibrium in which paper money is always
used as a medium of exchange, exists.
Proposition 4. Suppose that xgt+i 2

; A+A

s
+ 1

:Welfare under the perfect gold
standard equilibrium is maximized when xgt+i equals  for all i = 0; 1; 2; :::.
Proof: In equilibrium Ct+i = 1   Gt+i. The lower xgt+i the higher is At+i+1 for given
A0: Welfare increases when x
g
t+i approaches its lower bound : The discounted utilityP1
i=0 
tU

1 Gt+i; A
 
xgt+i

; where At+i+1 = 
iA0 +
Pi
t 
i 1 As   q 1  xg+i   1  is
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strictly decreasing on (xg; xg) =

; A+A

s
+ 1

for all i = 0; 1; 2; :::. When xg =  for all
i = 0; 1; ::: the discounted utility equals
1X
i=0
iU g (1 Gt+i; A ()) =
1X
i=0
i

ug (1 Gt+i) + vg

1
1  

qAs   q 1 (   1)  :
(35)
IfGt+i is constant (35) simplies to 11 

ug (1 G) + vg   1
1  [qA
s   q 1 (   1) ]	.
Under the gold standard with constant  the household consumes its whole gold endow-
ment and converts some of its existing paper currency to gold in equilibrium. When the
central bank commits to the gold convertibility rule and to keep  constant, the bank
loses the ability to boost production and employment by increasing the discretionary
money growth rate through discounting, hence the gold standard rule solves the time
inconsistency problem which arises from the sticky wage structure.
2.3 The Suspension of the Gold Standard Rule: Accommoda-
tion
Let us assume that the economy has been running for a su¢ ciently long period of time, so
that it has reached its long-run gold standard equilibrium described by propositions 3 and
4. In what follows I assume that the economy experiences an entirely unanticipated switch
from the normal state, which I call peaceto the bad state, war. All agents recognize
that war can last for several periods, but not forever. The exogenous change between
the states occurs after the rm and the household have set wages, but it is observed
simultaneously by both private and public agents. The war state di¤ers from peace in
that the gold endowment is zero and the households gold demand is exogenously dened
to approach Ag; the central banks gold stock. As a result of a bank run, the lowest bound
of x is no longer well dened by . If the central bank did not suspend the gold standard,
by (33) the price level would fall and the expected price level ! would be above the actual
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price level, and, as stated in section 2.1, this would have adverse e¤ects on employment
and production. From the rm and government cash-in-advance constraints, any gold
conversion would reduce the reserves on which the rm or the government can borrow.
Finally, from (34), a fall in the price level would reduce private consumption.
To restore monetary stability at the beginning of war, the central bank deviates from
the gold standard rule and starts following a new monetary policy rule called the suspen-
sion rule. The deviation is excusable and the new rule implies that during war the central
bank does not convert paper notes to gold immediately, but promises to resume the gold
convertibility at the old gold reserve ratio  and par value q at some future point after
the crises has passed and the gold reserve is again at its pre-war level.
Denition 2 The policy of the central bank during the suspension is a plan  ac-
cording to which the central bank (i) issues only unbacked paper money during war, (ii)
immediately after the war starts adjusting economy to the gold standard by withdrawing
paper money from circulation whilst still preventing money-to-gold conversion, and (iii)
resumes the gold standard at old par value q when  is at its pre-war level.
Figure (1) illustrates how the plan divides the suspension period into two stages, the
monetary expansion periods during war and the adjustment periods after the arrival of
peace. During war the suspension enables the central bank to stabilize production and
consumption by its private discount policy, and given that G increases during the war,
yield the government some seigniorage by its public discount policy. After the arrival of
peace the central bank adjusts the economy by constraining its discounts. The benet of
this policy is the timing of potential reduction in welfare after the war, not during the
war. In what follows I assume that periods between  and  + j   1 are the wartime
monetary expansion periods. Peace arrives in period  + j and periods between  + j and
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 + S; S <1 ; are the adjustment periods. Period  + S is the nal suspension period.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
The policy plan  induces future histories, and the policy plan together with agents
allocation rules induce future utilities. For each i = 0; 1; 2; :::; S; denote the history
of the central banks policy through time  + i by h+i = fd+k j k = 0; 1; :::i  1g ;
and h 1 = fdt = 1 j t = 0; 1; :::;    1g : For any policy plan  = f0; 1; :::g let +i =
f+i j i = 0; :::; Sg denote a sequence of policy plans from time  onward and +i the
continuation of : Policy plan  species the discretionary money growth rate d+i during
the suspension conditional on the realization of history h+i:
The sequence of events between periods  and +S is the following. At the beginning of
the rst stage of period +i, the household and the rm agree on nominal wages, thenAs is
observed by all, and then, the central bank announces its policy plan . Next, faced with
the history h+i 1; the household chooses the rst-stage allocation of  1;+i (h+i 1) =
(A+i+1; ) and a contingency plan for setting future actions for all possible future histories.
By denition, if As = 0;  1;+i (h+i 1) = 
i (A ) ; i.e. the households gold holdings
consists entirely of depreciating gold holdings it had at the beginning of war. The central
bank, faced with the history h+i 1; sets time  + i discretionary money growth rate
+i (h+i 1) = d+i and chooses a contingency plan for setting future money growth
rates. At the second stage of period  + i, both the household and the rm face the
history h+i = [h+i 1;  (h+i 1)] = (h+i 1; dt+i). The household chooses its second
stage allocation  2;+i (h+i) =
 
C+i; b+i;m
s
+i;m+i

and the contingency plan for all
future histories, and the rm chooses its allocation t+i (h+i) = (L+i; B+i+1) conditional
on realization of history h+i: These denitions recognize that the household makes its
decision in two stages and rm in one.
As in Ireland (1997) without commitment technology p+i and w+i are also functions
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of the history of the central banks policy: Starting from any date after the announcement
to suspend the cash payments, the private agents can forecast these variables using the
recursive formula h+i = [h+i 1; +i (h+i 1)] where i = 0; 1; :::; S; and their knowledge
of price level, wage and interest rate determination processes.
Consider rst the private agentsproblem during the suspension of the gold standard
rule. The representative rms problem is to choose L+i (h+i) and b+i+1 (h+i) to
maximize
1X
i=0
+if+i = 
+i [p+i (h+i)Y+i  R+ib+i (h+i 1)] (36)
subject to w+i (h+i)L+i (h+i)  +i+1b+i+1 (h+i) taking w+i (h+i) ; p+i (h+i) and
h+i = [h+i 1;  (h+i 1)] given for all i = 0; 1; :::; S.
The household chooses C+i; A+i+1; ms+i, and m+i to maximize
j 1X
i=0
iU

C+i (h+i) ; 
iA

+
1X
i=j
iU [C+i (h+i) ; A+i+1 (h+i 1)] (37)
subject to the the cash-in-advance constraint
p+iC+i  m+i + (x+i   1) +ims+i + +iw+iL+i; (38)
the budget constraint
d+ix+im+i+1+qA+i+1  m+i+qA+i++iw+iL+i+f+i+c+i p+iC+i t^t (39)
and the endowment constraint, which during the war periods i = 0; :::; j   1;reduces to
A+i = A+i+1 (40)
and during the adjustment periods i = j; :::; S to
qA+i + qA
s
+i   (x+i   1) +ims+i = qAt+i+1: (41)
From these denitions it follows that xt = 1 when i = 0; :::; j 1 (expansion); x  1 when
i = j; :::; S (adjustment) and x dened as under the gold standard if the gold standard is
resumed when i = S + 1.
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At each period  + i when i = 0; 1; :::; S; the central bank takes h+j 1 as given and
chooses a continuation policy +i to solve the following problem: choose d+i to maximize
(37), where C+i and A+i+1 are determined by 	 and ; subject to the terminal condition
m+S+1 =
qAg+S+1

: (42)
Appendix B establishes that the terminal condition (42) can be written as 
SY
i=0
x+id+i   1
!
m = Q
SX
i=j
(A+i + A
s   A+i+1) for S <1: (43)
The terminal condition states that monetary gold must be proportional to the circulating
money stock, and +i = ; by the time of the resumption. Incorporated in plan i;
the terminal condition implies that once the gold ow resumes, the central bank must
set d+i < 1, i = j; :::; S in order to withdraw the at money from circulation. The net
discretionary money growth satises
YS
i=0
d+i = 1: The price level and consumption
during the wartime expansion periods become:
p+i (h+i 1) = !

+i
 
1 + dt+i (h+i 1)  t+i
1 
(44)
C+i (h+i 1) = !
 
+i
 
1 + dt+i (h+i 1)  t+i
  G+i; (45)
and during the adjustment periods respectively:
p+i (h+i 1) = !

+i

1 + dt+i (h+i 1)xt+i (h+i 1)  t+i
1 
(46)
C+i (h+i 1) = !
 
+i

1 + dt+i (h+i 1)xt+i (h+i 1)  t+i
  G+i: (47)
As the discretionary money withdrawalrate during the adjustment satises 0  d+i  1;
the price level is lower during the adjustment than expansion. Whether the consumption
is lower during adjustment than war depends also on G+i.
Denition 3. A sustainable equilibrium (;;	) consists of a policy plan  and a
set of allocation rules (;	) that satisfy: (i) given a policy plan  and the households
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allocation rule 	, the continuation of  solves the rms problem to maximize (36) subject
to L+i and b+i, and history h+i; (ii) given  and the rms allocation rule ; the
continuation of 	 solves the households problem to maximize (37) subject to (38), (39),
(41) and history h+i 1 and ht+i; (iii) given the allocation rules (	;) ; the continuation
of plan  solves the central banks problem to choose d+i to maximize (37) for every
history h+i 1 and the terminal condition (43).
The sustainable outcome (d;  ; ) describes the sequence of equilibrium quantities and
prices that are obtained when the central bank chooses d+i sequentially to maximize
(37) subject to (43), and private agents respond optimally. As in Chari and Kehoe (1990)
and Ireland (1997) the set of sustainable outcomes is formed recursively: starting from
h 1 = 1; construct h = (h ; h+1; :::) and d = (d ; d+1; :::) recursively using d+i =
+i (h+i 1) and h+i = [h+i 1; +i (h+i 1)] : Then for all i = 0; 1; :::; S construct
 = (L ; L+1; :::; b ; b+i;:::) using L+i; b+i = (h+i) and  =
 
  ;  +1; :::

using
 1;+i = 	(h+i 1) and  2;+i = 	(h+i) for all i = 0; 1; :::. These recursive denitions
are used in the next section to illustrate how the central banks plan , if it is sustainable,
leads to the resumption of the gold standard.
3 Sustainability of the Resumption Plan
3.1 Sustainable Outcomes
In this section I use the model of sustainable plans to address the question raised in
the Introduction: What made monetary policy credible during suspension periods in the
absence of the commitment technology?
Consider the households decision making problem both during the expansion and the
adjustment periods. During war when As = 0 the household can either mint some of
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its existing gold holdings to specie, or use inconvertible paper currency as a medium of
exchange. Minting specie is not welfare maximizing because minting reduces gold in utility
yielding form, and once coined, specie is not convertible back to gold, and therefore, the
household uses paper currency as a medium of exchange. The cash-in-advance constraint
formalizes this assumption and embodies some relevant historical evidence. According
to Feavearyear (1963) p 184 during the Suspension Period of 1797-1821 in England the
public accepted the notes because there was nothing else and because they served the
purposes of trade for the time being as well as gold.
The war, however, lasts for a nite time and the return of the gold endowment gives the
household an opportunity to start minting coins and stop using paper money if it considers
the central banks plan to resume the gold standard not to be credible. The central bank
has an incentive to avoid the adjustment process, because withdrawing at money from
circulation has adverse real e¤ects on the economy with sticky nominal wages. It is the
threat imposed by the households revenge strategy that may support the resumption of
the gold standard. As in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Ireland (1997), the set of sustainable
outcomes, which in this model refers to the outcomes that result of the resumption of the
gold standard, can be characterized by adapting Abreu (1988) optimal penal codes to
monetary policy games played between a benevolent central bank and a large number of
private agents.
The autarky plan a is dened as follows. Private agents agree on w+i, then all
sectors observe that As > 0. The household then chooses a rst-stage allocation of
 1;+i (h+i 1) > 0 where i  j and a contingency plan for setting future actions for all
possible future histories. The central bank, given the history h+i 1; sets the time  + i
discretionary money growth rate in following manner: for any h+i 1 let a (h+i 1) be
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the optimal money growth rate in the problem: maximize
Ua (x+i; d+i) = max
d+i
U fC+i (h+i) ; A+i+1 [x+i (h+i 1)]g (48)
subject to d+i  d; where A+i+1 is given by  1;+i (h+i 1) and i  j. Next, at the
second stage of period  + i, both the household and the rm face the history h+i =
[h+i 1; a (h+i 1)]. The household chooses its second stage allocation  2;+i (h+i) and
the contingency plan for all future histories and the rm chooses its allocation t+i (h+i).
Proposition 5. The policy under the autarky plan is a+i (h+i 1) = d
a = d:
Proof: Period +i consumption (47) is strictly increasing in d+i 2
 
0; d

and d+j = d
maximizes (48). Instead of setting d+i 2 (0; 1) to withdraw paper money from circulation
at the beginning of the adjustment period, the central bank surprises the private agents
by unanticipated money creation. 
Propositions 6. The welfare under the autarky, Ua; is the maximum current-period
utility at period  + i which the central bank can obtain by deviating from its policy plan
+i (h+i 1) at time +i, given that the central bank has followed the plan in every period
prior to the deviation.
Proof : The policy under the autarky does not have an e¤ect on the rst stage al-
location under autarky,  a1;+i = 	
a (h+i 1) = A+i+1 but the second stage allocation
 a2;+i = 	
a (h+i) implies that consumption becomes
Ca+i = !
 
+i

1  t+i + dxt+i
  G+i (49)
where x+i (h+i 1)  1. Ca+i is the maximum current-period consumption at period
 + i the central bank can achieve by supplying the maximum amount of paper money.

As the result of the deviation from the declared policy plan  the economy reverts to
the commodity money system which is a static equilibrium, because the allocation rules
26
and policy plans do not depend on the past history. The household has abandoned the
paper currency altogether, only specie circulates and nancial intermediation does not
exist.
Denition 3: The static equilibrium (s;	s;s) is dened as follows. For any history
i > j;

h+i 1; s+i (h+i 1)

= ;: For every history h+i 1 the rule species that the
household does not take any gold to the central bank, but mints some of its gold holdings
to specie. With the given history ht+i the household chooses A+i+1; S+i; Ss+i; and C+i
to maximize
U s = max
z+i
1X
i=0
tU [C+i; A+i+1 (z+i)] (50)
subject to the specie-in-advance constraint
p+iC+i  qS+i + q (1  ) (z+i   1)Ss+i; (51)
the budget constraint
z+iS+i+1 + qA+i+1  qS+i + qA+i + w+iL+i + f+i (52)
+qAs+i   p+iC+i   q (z+i   1)Ss+i   t^+i
and the gold endowment constraint
qAs + qA+i   qA+i+1 = q (z+i   1)Ss+i (53)
for all i > j: The nominal variables have been scaled with Ss+i+1 = z+iS
s
+i.
As the paper currency has lost its value, specie is the only medium of exchange. With-
out paper money the central bank is not able to o¤er nancial intermediation services.
Proposition 7. The static outcome (;;  s; s) implies that C+i = 1 G+i; L+i = 1
and A+i+1 = A+i + As   q 1 (z   1) where z  1:
Proof : The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3, but ms and m are replaced
with Ss and S. 
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Proposition 8. Welfare under the static equilibrium,
U s (1 G+i; A (zs)) =

us (1 Gt+i) + vs
 
A+i + A
s   q 1 (z   1) (54)
is lower than under the gold standard.
Proof : The optimal money growth rate under the gold standard, xg =  < 1; but
the optimal specie supply rate z  1 because the smelting of specie is illegal. In the
steady state the laws of motion (5) implies that z = 1 + (1  ) = (1 + ). The faster
the depreciation of specie or the higher the brassage, the higher is z. Under the static
equilibrium gold specie is used as a medium of exchange, which together with  and
 reduce A+i+1, gold in the utility yielding form. 
The next proposition characterizes the entire set of sustainable outcomes which ensure
the resumption of the gold standard. For an arbitrary sequence of policies and allocations
(d; ;  ) ; the revert-to-static policy plans specify continuation with the plan to resume
the gold standard as long as the policy dened by the original plan has been chosen in the
past. The allocation rule species that immediately after a deviation the household and
the rm will follow the rule dened by the static allocation rule and stay in this static
state in all subsequent periods.
Proposition 9. Sustainability of the resumption of the gold standard: let d be an
arbitrary policy and (;  ) an arbitrary allocation. Then the return to the perfect gold
standard is sustainable if and only if (d; ;  ) satises
SX
i=j
j iU+i +
1X
i=S+1
S+j iU g+i  Ua +

1  U
s; (55)
where A+i+1; C+i; S+i+1; Ss+i; m+i+1 and m
s
+i are given by  ; and L+i and b+i
are given by :
Proposition 9 implies that the resumption of the gold standard is sustainable, if the
adjustment to the gold standard between periods  + j and  + S and gold standard
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thereafter will yield at least as much utility as default on period  + j and static state
thereafter. Incentive compatibility constraint (55) completely characterizes the conditions
under which an arbitrary sequence of policies and allocations is sustainable. The adjust-
ment between periods  + j and  + S and the gold standard thereafter must provide
at least as much utility from  + j forward than what is obtained by deviating from the
resumption plan in period  + j and reverting to the autarky thereafter. Inequality (55)
is the key result of this paper. It suggests that countries returned to the gold standard
after war time suspensions because the benets of the gold standard did outweigh the
cost of adjustment, which was a necessary procedure for resumption.
3.2 The Suspensions and Sustainable Plans: Some Examples
The ultimate objective of this example is to illustrate the logic behind Proposition 9, and
to dene under what conditions resumption of the gold standard is a sustainable plan.
To avoid having to work with approximations I develop a simple example in which war
lasts for a period and the central banks plan ; which denes monetary policy during
the suspension, implies that the bank withdraws all wartime duciary paper money from
circulation during the period that follows immediately after the war period.
During the suspension the central banks problem is to choose the optimal discre-
tionary money growth rate dwar to maximize the households discounted net utility (37)
subject to requirements that prices and quantities are determined by allocation rules
(;	) that solve the rm and household problems and are consistent with the terminal
condition (42) and plan . In this example I assume that Gwar = 1 and Gpea = 0. The
utility function (37) takes a log-linear form [logC+i +  logA+i+1] and parametric val-
ues are following:  = 0:99; K = 10;  = 0:5; q = 1;  = 0:5 and As = 2. I choose
the parameter values so that under the gold standard steady state the ratio between the
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utility yielded from gold to the utility from consumption is relatively small, i.e. 0.15.
Price expectations are formed so that !+i = p+i 1; thus !war = pgold, and the price level
during war exceeds the expected price level.
If the adjustment period follows the war period, the terminal condition (42) implies
that all duciary paper money issued during war must be withdrawn from circulation
on the following adjustment period. As a result the withdrawal rate dadj becomes an
inverse of dwar, i.e. dadj = 1=dwar; so that (42) holds. Furthermore, the gold backing
ratio during adjustment can now be dened in terms of dwar : From (14) we have that
adj = =dwar, in which  is the constant gold reserve ratio during the gold standard.
Given above specications, the households consumption during the war and adjustment
periods become:
Cwar = !
 
war (1 + dwar   )1   Gwar (56)
Cadj = !
 
adj
 
1 + dadj   adj
1   Gpea = ! adj 1 + 1  dwar
1 
 Gpea. (57)
Equations (56) and (57) imply that dwar increases Cwar and wartime welfare U (Cwar),
but respectively, reduces Cadj and welfare during the adjustment period.
Figure 2 plots both sides of the inequality (55) for dwar. The circled line is the left
hand side of (55), the discounted net utility under the adjustment and the gold standard.
As can be seen from gure 2, the discounted utility falls when dwar increases, because
the households welfare function during the adjustment period is a decreasing function of
dwar.
The solid line in gure 2 plots the right hand side of inequality (55). By contrast,
the relative benet of a default increases if dwar increases because the higher dwar, the
higher the welfare loss of adjustment is going to be. By defaulting the plan to resume the
gold standard the central bank avoids the costly adjustment process. I assume, loosely
based on the default of assignats in France in 1796 (Aubin (2008)), that a default of  is
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equivalent to a fourfold increase in the money growth rate in one period.
The commodity money illustrates a situation where the private agents do not trust the
monetary system and therefore, only coins with intrinsic value are accepted as a medium of
exchange. The gold consumption under the static state is At+1 = At+As q 1 (z   1)Ss,
thus any coinage reduces gold in utility yielding form. Here I set the coinage rate at
z = 1:04. Coins are involved with direct costs such as handling and transmission costs,
and depreciation. The depreciation rate of gold coins depends on the quality of metal and
minting techniques which were poor until the mechanical minting started in the 1830s.
In addition, illegal activities such as clipping and shaving reduced the weight of coins,
so that instead of by face value, during the historical gold standard period coins were
accepted only by weight (Craig (1953)).
Given the above specications the highest sustainable discretionary money growth rate
during war is 2.30, when (55) holds with equality. As gure 2 suggests, if dwar 2 (1; 2:30)
the resumption of the gold standard is sustainable, and the circelled line that plots the
discounted net utility of adjustment and gold standard thereafter lies above the solid line
that plots default and deviation. However, if the central bank sets the money growth
rate dwar above 2.30, default and the commodity money standard thereafter would yield
higher utility than resumption of the gold standard.
Finally, assume that the central bank sets dwar = 2:30. This is also the optimal
sustainable money growth rate during the war because it can be shown that if there is
only one war period and one adjustment period, total net utility (37) is increasing in
dwar. Figure 3 illustrates the level of consumption and prices when the gold standard is
suspended at the beginning of period 1, the economy is adjusted in period 2 and the gold
standard is resumed at the beginning of period 3. As can be seen, both the price level and
consumption increase during war. In the adjustment period consumption falls, because
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the price level is now below its expected level. After the resumption both the price level
and consumption approach gradually their level under the gold standard. The benet of
suspension is that welfare reducing adjustment occurs during peacetime, not during war
when the pressure on the government expenditure is likely to be high.
4 Conclusions
In this paper I reassess the suspension of the gold standard rule in the light of developments
in monetary theory since Kydland and Prescott (1977). The paper models a contingent
gold standard that allows for intervals during which only paper money circulates with
a variable nominal price. I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the gold
standard and the suspension, which suggests that the suspension is a credible monetary
regime, because the resumption of the gold standard at the old par value in the future
is a sustainable plan that replaces the gold standard as a commitment technology during
war.
By building on an example rst developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Chari
and Kehoe (1990) demonstrate that the sustainable equilibrium associated with the pol-
icy plan is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that are supported
both by reputation and extreme trigger strategies. In my model the central banks plan
denes that after the war the monetary authority has to start adjusting the economy to
the gold standard. Because the adjustment might reduce welfare temporarily, the author-
ity has a temptation to deviate, i.e. maximize the current periods utility by printing an
arbitrarily large amount of money. The outcome is deviation to a permanent static state
in which paper money has lost its value and only gold specie circulates as a medium of
exchange. The commodity money standard is ine¢ cient: it does not facilitate nancial
intermediation, and depreciation and minting costs reduce gold available in utility yield-
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ing form. The gold standard is resumed, because it maximizes welfare in the long-run.
The gold standard solves the economys time inconsistency problem as the benevolent
central bank is not able to conduct time consistent monetary policy without commitment
technology in the good state of the world.
This article contributes to the understanding of a major development in monetary
history, the suspension of the gold standard rule, when only inconvertible at paper
money circulated. By some tailoring this model could be used in future research to
explore individual suspension periods in detail. If the gold endowment was replaced with
the competitive gold market, the model would permit analysis of the market price of gold,
of which premium increased during the suspensions, but fell the end of suspension. In
this model the central bank chooses the money growth rate to maximize the social welfare
given the terminal condition, but Bordo and Redish (1993) and Bordo and Kydland (1996)
follow the revenue-smoothing hypothesis of Mankiw (1987), and suggest that central banks
suspended the gold standard to smooth public revenue from both taxes and seigniorage.
Finally, the Ramsey policy in this model could be expanded to include taxation and
borrowing in addition to the money growth rate to give accurate description of economic
policy during the historical suspension periods.
Even though this model of sustainable plans is theoretical, it could explain broadly
some key monetary developments during historical suspension periods. For example, in
France in 1790, in England in 1797 and in the US in 1861 the commodity standard was
suspended not just to create seigniorage but rather as an emergency measure to stabilize
the circulation of paper currency. During war, or revolution in the case of France, the
money stock increased steadily, but in England and the US, where the resumption of the
gold standard remained credible during war, monetary authorities started to withdraw pa-
per money from circulation immediately after the arrival of peace, and the price level fell
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respectively. By contrast, in France the revolutionary Jacobin government attempted to
support the value of assignats with the laws of the Maximum which turned assignats into
a guillotine-backed currency. Once Jacobin party was overthrown, controls weekended,
and in 1796 after a hyperination the Directory demonetarized all 44 billion assignats.
This model assumed that the default to resume the gold standard will destroy the credi-
bility of monetary policy forever. In France after the default the new dictator, Napoleon
Bonaparte, conducted a series of institutional changes and gave an impression that he
detested the lending and paper money practices of the previous governments. According
to Bordo and White (1991) his pronouncements were aimed at restoring condence, but
since the reputation of the country was destroyed, this was probably the best he could do,
and he failed to secure enough funds for the disastrous Russian Campaign. England and
the US, by contrast, resumed the gold standard successfully. These two countries became
rivals in the nancial leadership of the world and the gold standard helped them to secure
real, non-inationary growth until the First World War. (For historical accounts of these
three periods, see an earlier version of this paper Newby (2008), or for example, Clapham
(1944), Sargent and Velde (1995) and Friedmand and Schwartz (1963).)
Bordo and Redish (1993) argue that the gold standard survived in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries because it permitted temporary suspension of convertibility. The
sustainability of the resumption plan gave the monetary authority an opportunity to
conduct accommodative policies during war. Yet, to achieve this favorable position, the
authority had to resist its temptation both to issue too liberally and to avoid the costly
adjustment. The gold standard could only function as a contingent rule, if the resumption
of the gold standard was a sustainable plan.
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Appendix A
Equilibrium under the gold standard The household maximizes (16) subject to
constraints (17), (18) and (27) for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::, taking As; pt; R; 
f
t ; 
c
t and wt given
for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. The Lagrangian becomes
L =
1X
t=0
t f[u (Ct) + v (At+1)]
+t
h
mt + qSt + qAt + qA
s + wtLt + 
f
t + 
c
t   ptCt   qAt   t^t   dtxtmt+1 + qSt+1   qAt+1
i
+t [mt + qSt + (xt   1) tms + q (1  ) (zt   1)Sst + wtLt   ptCt]
+t [q (A
s + At)  q (zt   1)Sst   (xt   1) tmst   qAt+1]g
where t, t and t are Lagrangian multipliers on the budget, cash-in-advance and gold
endowment constraints. The rst order conditions are
Ct : uC (t) = pt (t + t)
At : q (t + t) = vA (t+ 1) + q
 
t+1 + t+1

mt+1 : dtxtt = 
 
t+1 + t+1

mst : t = t
St+1 : t = 
 
t+1 + t+1

Sst : t (1  ) = t
and
lim
t!1
t (t + t)At = 0
lim
t!1
t (t + t)mt = 0
lim
t!1
t (t + t)St = 0:
By dening m0 = S0 = 1 and using market clearing conditions (22)-(24), and (25) and
(26), the cash-in-advance constraint can be written as (29).
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By writing Ct = Yt Gt and substituting normalized (13) and (25) into the left-hand-
side of (17), reorganizing, and writing this for pt gives
pt = !

t f1 + q + q (1  ) (zt   1)   + dtxtg1  (A1)
and substituting this back to (29) gives
Ct = !
 
t f1 + q + q (1  ) (zt   1)   + dtxtg  Gt: (A2)
Proof of Proposition 1 In a gold standard equilibrium with constant  the central
bank commits to a policy fdt = 1 j t = 0; 1; 2; :::g. As a result dt = 1 in the above La-
grangian and rst order conditions. In equilibrium (see proposition 2) the expected price
level !t must equal the actual price level pt; which becomes
pt = f1 + q + q (1  ) (zt   1)   + xtg for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::
If !t = pt; from (13) Yt = 1 and the households consumption simplies to Ct = 1   Gt;
thus in equilibrium consumption is independent of xt or zt. However, in equilibrium the
gold consumption is a decreasing function of xt and zt, because taking gold to the central
bank or coinage reduce gold available in consumable form. The private gold consumption
is
At+1 = At + A
s   (zt   1)Sst  
xt   1
q
;
where xt 2 (; x) ; x = 1 + q At+As and zt 2 (1; z) ; z = 1 + At + As. Therefore, as long
as xt 2 (; 1) using only paper currency as a medium of exchange yields at least as high
utility than using both paper currency and coins, or only coins, as a medium of exchange.
In the gold standard equilibrium with a constant  the household utility is maximized
when zt = 1 and xt =  for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
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Appendix B
The terminal condition states that when the gold standard is resumed, money must be
proportional to gold stock
M+S+1 =
QAg+S+1

:
By substituting the left-hand-side by x+Sd+SM+S = M+S+1 and writing the right-
hand-side by using
Ag+i+1   Ag+i = A+i + As+i   A+i+1
we get
x+Sd+SM+S = QA
g
+S +Q
 
A+S + A
s
+S   A+S+1

Continuing this recursively backwards until the beginning of the suspension and recog-
nizing that the gold ow resumes at period  + j we get that
xd :::x+S 1d+S 1x+Sd+SM = QAg +Q
SX
i=j
 
A+i + A
s
+i   A+i+1

:
By writing QAg = M and reorganizing we get 
SY
i=0
x+id+i   1
!
M = Q
SX
i=j
 
A+i + A
s
+i   A+i+1

: (C1)
If (C1) is scaled by M s we have (43).
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Figures
Figure 1: The timeline of a suspension
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Figure 2: Discounted net utilities of the resumption of the gold standard and default
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Figure 3: Consumption and price level under war (period 1) and adjustment (period 2)
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